Beyond Radicalisation (excerpt)

Designing the Role of Civil Society to combat radicalisation in New Zealand and the Pacific

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1.0   Introduction

The spread of Islam in these countries (Pacific Islands) will pose a grave threat to
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and other Non-Muslim Countries in this area.

(Margaret, 8 August 2007)[1]

Before March 15, you might have thought that New Zealand and the Pacific island countries would be immune from terrorists attack, whether from white supremacists or from the geographically long reach of ISIS. However, radicalisation, terrorism, and violent extremism are real threats to international peace and security globally, regionally, and nationally. Other regions which are geo-politically 'away' from zones of conflict including New Zealand and other Pacific island countries are no exception. My focus here is on the threat from Islamist radicalisation in New Zealand and the Pacific region, and how to effectively respond. The principles could be applied to terrorist threats from white supremacism too, although my primary focus in this paper is on Islamist radicalisation.

New Zealand has not been immune to this threat. A female Somali refugee Asha Ali Abdille was sentenced to nine years for trying to hijack an Air New Zealand aircraft (Hallett 2010). A Maori man, Kireka-Whaanga openly announced his full support for ISIS and suggested Kiwi fighters should not be stopped from joining ISIS. He used the ISIS emblem to say "I am a Muslim and I support Islamic State" on his profile picture on Facebook (Wall and Sharpe 2014). A Hamilton Kiwi, Mark John Taylor (who also goes by the name Muhammad Daniel or Abu Abdul Rahman) was designated a terrorist by the US for fighting for ISIS in Syria (Wright 2017). In mid 2016, two young New Zealand men, Imran Patel (26 years old) and Niroshan Nawarajan (27 years old) were the first in New Zealand to face charges associated with home-grown radicalisation (Dennett 2016). Just earlier this year, after being radicalised online, a Kiwi teenager left school at the age of 15 and planned a mass killing in Christchurch (Clarkson 2018). We now know that a terrorist attack in that city was infact being planned by a white suppremacist, and our Security Services appeared to have no idea. Overall, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) has about 30 to 40 people in New Zealand on its watch list as people who could be associated with Islamic State (Watkins 2017).

Throughout its history, New Zealand has not been immune from violent threats that would be described as terrorism. Beath (2012) listed at least six related-terror threats in New Zealand. In 1913, a blasted bomb smashed a rail system transporting coal from Denniston on the West Coast of the South Island, during a widespread industrial strike; in 1951, a rail bridge was blown up to unsettle coal supplies; in 1969-1970, military basis and some other sites were bomb-blasted to protest against the Vietnam War; in 1982 there was an attempt to bomb the Wanganui police computer centre; in 1984, a bomb exploded at the Trade Hall in Wellington, related to an anti-union act; and in 1987, the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior was blown up by French secret agents.

The Pacific is not the peaceful place we would like to think. In 2008, Fiji's government re-established the Fiji Intelligence Service (FIS) after being abolished in 1999. This revival by the Bainimarama administration has been linked to global rising terrorism threats, especially the

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[1] http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/105700 Accessed 21.09.18

events of 9/11 in 2001 and Bali bomb blast in 2002 and 2005. Undeniably, the reestablishment was to avoid similar threats in Fiji.

A leading scholar on terrorism and violent extremism, Professor Greg Barton of Deakin University observes that the vulnerability of New Zealand and other Pacific islands countries to violent Islamist extremism is only a matter of time, (Cowlishaw 2016). Geographical remoteness is no assurance of safety (Gattey 2018). Barton even imagines that online radicalisation and terrorism could become more of a threat to New Zealand in the future. "I suspect that the next five years will bring more challenges than the past five years in New Zealand", Barton argues (Gattey 2018).

This paper examines the so-called deradicalisation projects in the Muslim world, especially from the most Muslim majority country, Indonesia, which has been suffering from terrorism for some time. From the Indonesian case, this paper also shows how civil society can fight and counter terrorism by introducing and applying deradicalisation programmes in Muslim societies in Indonesia. As a result, this paper also offers some insights for such projects in New Zealand and Pacific Islands countries.

2.0   Understanding Radicalisation

Scholars generally explain radicalisation as a 'fast change movement through violent ways'. Porta and LaFree more specifically narrow it down by defining it as a process marked by a rising commitment to violence, or commitment allowing violent ways and strategies in any conflicts (2012: 6-7).

For radicalisation which operates within a religious context, individuals latch on to a religious 'truth' which they claim reflects their faith, or a 'truth' representing a certain group within a religion. If religious elites re involved, the radicalised individuals then claim they are accessing the most authoritative religious doctrines and they are most representative group. When they extend this claim into action, they create a privileged position for themselves as the most authoritative group to force and judge other contrasting groups. In the context of radicalised Muslims, they might consider non-Islamic governments as a combination of 'evil', digression from the true faith, and contrary to Islamic law.

Many scholars identify several issues as causes of radicalisation. After examining many cases of radicalism leading to terrorism, scholars initially identify economic-social marginalisation and less education as the main roots of radicalisation. Many of the terrorist brides come from this social stratification. Richardson points out that disaffected minority groups are vulnerable to radicalisation (2006: 59).

In the context of international, regional, and national politics, authoritarianism has been identified as another motive of radicalisation.

More specifically, most radicalised Muslims consider the political and economic 'double standards' of the West has grown and harvested terrorism. In terms of Islamic ideology,

Ibrahim and Halaby mention *takfiri* ideology and extreme understanding of jihad as the point of radicalisation (0000). Richardson mentions it as legitimising ideology (2006: 59).

Radical and Terrorist Groups

The process of radicalisation is accelerated by establishing a new radical group or joining an existing one. The groups may link to each other. A person being radicalised must have been exposed to new radical ideas from someone else associated with other radical groups. This is common among those identified as radical.

There are a few terrorist groups closely associated to internal politics within a nation state. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, Communist Party of India (CPI) or Indian Maoist, Revolutionnary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) in South America, and Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland are among groups assigned as radical, separatist, and terrorist, and associated with a nation state.

Radical groups have been widely associated with all religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Within Christianity, for instance, many recorded groups have been associated with terrorist actions. This includes the Lord Resistance Army in Uganda, the Central Africa Republic Christian Militias, the Christian White Supremacists in America and Canada, the Phineas Priesthood, the Concerned Christians, Christian Srebrenica Army, the Eastern Lightening Church of the Almighty God, the National Liberation Front of Tripura in India, and many more.[2] Including the recent attack in Christchurch. Within Judaism, terrorist groups have included Zealotry, Sicarii, Jewish Defense League (JDL) or Kach and Kahane Chai, Hashomer or Haganah, an so forth. (REF)

Within Islam, a long list of contemporary terrorist groups include Al Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-'Iraq wa al-Sham (DAESH), Taliban (Afghanistan), Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb / Aqim (Algeria), AQAP/Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia), ETIM/East Turkistan Islamic Militant (China, Turkistan), Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (Ethiopia), ASG/Abu Sayaf Group (the Philippines), Asbet Al Anshar (Lebanon), Boko Haram (Nigeria), Asyabab (Somalia), Jabhat Al-Nusrat (Syria), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Jamaah Ansarut Tauhid (AT), Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State (NII), Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Southeast Asia.

In the context of Muslim terrorism, they claim to have particular objectives and strategies when establishing the groups or committing terrorist actions. Generally, they aim at legalising the total application of Islamic law. In particular, Al Qaeda and ISIS/DAESH for example aim at establishing an Islamic caliphate to rule the whole world or at least to unite the pre-dominantly Muslim states and countries. In internal Islam contexts, ISIS also has another objective which is to fight against hypocrites and apostates within Muslim society. In more local and nationalist contexts, terrorist groups in the Middle East aim at expelling the Salibis, including Jews, Christians, and Americans from Muslim lands.

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[2] https://www.upworthy.com/a-troll-demanded-a-muslim-man-show-examples-of-christian-terrorists-he-delivered Accessed 20.09.18 (4.14pm).

In Indonesia, the terrorist groups have different stories and objectives. Due to their political disappointment with the central government of Indonesia, especially regarding the strategic distribution of military posts, the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) accelerated their resistance by echoing the desire for a total application of Islamic law and the establishment of a real Islamic state in Indonesia. For the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), their goal was to fight against the West , the 'enemy of Islam', and all other interests of the West. They all believe that in order to establish these objectives, they are permitted to commit terrorism, to kill women and children, and to to rob (fay') to finance their activities.

All of these objectives and strategies resulted in a number of terrorist actions across Indonesia. Since 2000, this includes communal/sectarian conflict in Ambon and Poso (1999-2000), Christmas bomb in 10 cities (2000), Bali bomb 1 (2002), J.W. Marriot 1, Jakarta (2003), Australian embassy, Jakarta (2004), Bali bomb 2 (2005), J.W. Marriot 2 and Ritz Carlton (2009), Jatih Asih plan targeting Indonesian president, Jakarta (2009), terror plan for Bali 3 (March 2012), online MLM hacker in billion rupiah, police murder and bomb terror in Poso, bomb plan against the the Governor of South Sulawesi in Makassar, armed robbery at gold shops and banks, and so forth.

Image 1: Terrorism in Modern Indonesia

Consequently, all these terrorist actions resulted in a number of executions and arrests across Indonesia. There were about 950 suspected terrorists in the legal system during 2000 to 2014. Ninety-six of them were shot dead on the spot, twelve died in suicide bombings, three were sentenced to death, 74 people were returned after thorough examination, 19 people were in the investigation process, 19 people in litigation, 349 people were sentenced to jail, and about 380 freed after spending years in prison. Moreover, in the context of global jihad during 2014, 60 people and 286 people were arrested in July and October respectively, 514 people were still unidentified, and there were more or less 800 suspected jihadis.

TOTAL : 422 Terrorism recidivists, in 74 prisons and 1 in special prison

ACEH 1
South Sumatera 4
North Sulawesi 2
West Sumatera 2
RIAU 2
West Kalimantan 1
East Kalimantan 4
Gorontalo 1
Mollucas 11
Riau 1
Central Kalimantan 2
South Sumatera 9
Bangka Belitung 3
Southeast Sulawesi 3
Bengkulu 6
South Sulawesi 5 in 3 prisons
Jakarta 11 in 2 prisons
West Java 126 in 14 prisons
East Java 31 in 17 prisons
Banten 6 in 3 prisons
Central Java 172 in 14 prisons
Jogjakarta 3
East Nusa Tenggara 10 in 5 prisons

The questions now is how to deal with these 950 suspected jihadis. The death penalty, or even life in prison is not going to work for all 950 suspects, let alone the moral arguments against this. In the specific Indonesian context, the question is what to do with the detained 500 terrorists, or 200 ex-terrorist convicts, or with the 380 terrorism recidivists. We have to focus on prevention in some contexts. The question is how to prevent potentially-influencial groups recruiting more people. And in national context, how do we secure the nation from all threats of terrorism. Authorities in different countries need to design a more systematic strategy to deal with terrorist threats, before they become terrorist actions.

Global Counter-terrorism
The 2017 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) annually produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is based on the data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

It identifies about 170,000 terrorist incidents around the world from 2000 to 2017.
In response, different countries have designed a number of approaches to counter terrorism and radicalism. In hard power context, Sri lanka has applied a military approach (although after the Easter terrorist attacksthis year, it appears its security services and government officials were asleep at the wheel, despite this military approach to dealing with threats). In contrast, the UK has strengthened its law enforcement capacity. Singapore and Malaysia employ special intelligence service to counter terrorism and radicalism. In terms of soft power, many governments apply negotiation (as was done for Independent Aceh Movement or GAM in Indonesia), economic development, counter ideology, counter radicalisation, as well as deradicalisation.

Image 1: Global Terrorism Index 2017

The UK authorities introduced the 'Prevent' initiative as a counter-terrorism programme in 2003. It aims at stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism in the first place. The programme sets out to prevent people from networking or connecting with terror groups. In 2017, the initiative has been expanded to anticipate the danger of radicalisation among young children or teens in vulnerable situations.

The United States also introduced a prevention programme called Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). It was a response to a perceived increase in radicalization among Muslim citizens in the U.S. As an "effort to reduce the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means", the CVE is expected to be broad enough to cover all general efforts, and narrow enough to exclude support for other kinds of violent organisations (insurgent groups or gangs). The CVE also aims to resist coercive kinds of "countering" such as arrest, or ultimately lethal targeting or even war. It is an acknowledgement of the spectrum of support to terrorist ideology, ranging from 'lone wolves' to bona fide members of terrorist groups, including law-abiding supporters (sympathisers) and law-breaking supporters. In other words, the CVE is specifically designed to reduce the number of sympathisers and demobilise supporters; to reduce the number of people vulnerable to becoming sympathisers; and as a response to a perceived increase in radicalisation among Muslim citizens.

Another programme of deradicalisation has been introduced as Risk Reduction Initiatives (Horgan & Braddock (2010; 2009).

2.1   Defining Deradicalisation

The approaches above could be considered as 'deradicalisation'. However, it is not always that simple. In general, deradicalisation shares the same connotation as counter-terrorism. But deradicalisation is more specific and more personal when dealing with prevention amongst vulnerable people drawn to support radical ideas and actions. It also deals with

changing ideology among terrorists. Deradicalisation needs to be implemented when appropriate, and on a case by case basis.

Radicalisation is easily understood as a process signified by an increasing commitment to violence, or commitment to allow any violent ways and strategies in any conflict. The process may include changes in faith, feeling, and behaviour which increasingly justify violence. Radicalisation covers two closely connected elements - action and attitude. But one doesn't always lead to the other. Radical behaviour or attitudes, don't always lead to violent actions. The processes of radicalisation must be understood analytically as they might be directed to different orientations and mechanisms, following different frameworks, and contextual to their socio-political settings.

Deradicalisation includes all efforts to transform thinking and belief from radical ideas and ideology to non-radical ideas through various multi and interdisciplinary disciplines (religious, social, and cultural) for people who are potentially influenced or have been influenced by a radical creed.

Deradicalisation approaches have some different strategies when dealing with the target as a group and as an individual. The organisation, group, or cell, demand particular approaches as they include the elites and members, institutionalised ideology, and unique characters from other groups. Meanwhile, the individuals should be approached personally via all mechanisms available, such as education, economy, and socio-religious lives. In this regard, when dealing with a group, the collective deradicalisation can be seen as disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration. When dealing with individuals, deradicalisation could take the forms of role change, disengagement, and self-deradicalisation.

Image 2: Approaches of Deradicalisation

Scholars have discussed the intersection between deradicalisation and disengagement. While the latter is generally considered as separating a person from radical actions and cutting off the chain of radical groups, and therefore is a short-term project, the former as an effort at

cognitive change or to moderate the radical ideology - and these are long term programmes. Scholars have described the deradicalisation work at an Ideological level (Barrett & Bokhari 2009; Boucek 2008; Abuza 2009), which can be abstract and difficult to measure the success.

3.0   Deradicalisation in Indonesia

Indonesia has experienced the development of approaches and methods of counter-terrorism. These developments are closely linked with different regimes ruling at diferent times. In the 'Old Order' (1954-1965) era, the central government employed a military approach to anyone or groups condemned as terrorists, separatists, or rebels. The government of the 'New Order' (1966-1998) used Intelligence service for counter-terrorism. In this regard, the government through Badan Intelijen Nasional or the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) and Badan Koordinasi Pertahanan Nasional or the National Defence Coordination Agency (Bakortanas) were authorised to take necessary actions in the framework of counter-terrorism.

The government of the 'Reformation Era' (1998 onward) has a different story. It initially focuses on law enforcement to counter-terrorism. However, during 1998-2002 it now uses few government units including military, police, intelligence, and eventually Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or the National Agency for Counter-terrorism (BNPT). In the last decade, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation are entirely coordinated by the BNPT.

The BNPT is responsible directly to the President, on the same level as other ministers. However, the Head of the BNPT is not regarded as a member of the presidential cabinet. There are three deputies under the Head of the BNPT. They are the Deputy One of Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalisation, the Deputy Two of Prosecution and Capacity Building, and the Deputy Three of International Relations. Under these deputies, there are directorates dealing with particular issues within the deputies. The Directorate of Deradicalisation is responsible for designing and applying the deradicalisation programme.

Image 4: The Structure of the BNPT

To support the BNPT's programmes, there is another structure just under the Head called an Expert Group that is expected to suggest academic opinions about the projects. The Expert Group consists of academics, public intellectuals, religious elites, and researchers. The BNPT has also established two task units namely Task Unit of Prevention under the Deputy One, and Task Unit of Prosecution under the Deputy Two. In order to extend its role to the provinces, the BNPT has formed Forum Komunikasi Penanggulangan Terorisme or Communication Forum for Counter-terrorism (FKPT) across Indonesia.

The BNPT and its stakeholders have collaborated and designed the national strategy for counter-terrorism which includes all levels of society that might be vulnerable for radicalisation and terrorism activities. This strategy has been specifically designed after conducting short- and long-term thorough research on the same approaches and policies from other countries that have been suffering from terrorism.

The BNPT has categorised levels of society to be approached in different ways to counter-radicalism. These categories include the Core, the Militant, the Supporters, the Sympathisers, and the Community in general. The Core layer is identified as the intellectual actor behind the terrorism activities. This could be spiritual and religious elites, or simply the political or arm force leaders within the terrorist groups. They are described as 'the brain' who doesn't usually get involved in the technicalities of bombing or suicide bombs. Some of them manoeuvre individually or within their group, and institutionally by networking with other similar groups. They are considered the most dangerous layer and the biggest threat as they keep producing new generations of radicals.

The Militant is understood as the second layer who execute terrorist actions. They act as the *avant garde* of terror. They have no fear of death, being captured and sentenced to death or

imprisonment. They are generally youth recruited by the key elite from the Core layer. They are sometimes called "the bride or the groom" of terror. Slightly different, the Supporter layer consists of individuals or groups who voluntarily provide supporting mediums for the terrorist actions which include training, funding and hiding place for the terrorists. The share the radical ideology with the Militant and the Core layers. The success and the failure of a terrorist action is determined by the availability of supporting resources including finance, bomb making materials, arms, media recruitment, and training camps.

Image 5: Layers of the Radicals

The Symphatiser layer constitutes groups and individuals who share the same radical ideas and ideology and potentially provide backings for terrorist groups, but they are not directly involved in such activities. As an indirect threat, they often facilitate the dissemination of radical ideas and thoughts. The Community in general is the people who are vulnerable to be radicalised in certain ways and approaches. This layer might be aware or unaware of the process of radicalisation through the knowledge they are absorbing via their community.

The core, militant, supporter, and sympathiser layers are the real target of the supervised deradicalisation programmes. They are the target of these programmes as they all have been identified as having radical ideas and thoughts. If these layers are broken down, they will include the terrorists, ex-terrorists, terrorism recidivists, potential radicals, networks and family members of terrorists. Meanwhile, the community layer will be approached through counter-radicalisation and prevention programmes.

For BNPT, the deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes are included under the soft approach. The latter covers the increase of awareness and prevention force, as well as media literacy, while the former deals with the supervision of the terrorists, ex-terrorists, terrorism recidivists, potential radicals, networks and the family members of terrorists. In

general, the deradicalisation programme will be defining targeted groups, mapping the levels of radicalism, and understanding motives and the links between particular groups. Conversely, the hard approach will be implemented as law enforcement, intelligent operation, the '88 special force', and general counter-terrorism approaches.

Civil Society and Deradicalisation: Preventing not Accusing
Any government cannot work alone when in the area of counter-terrorism. It must be a collective work. International cooperation for counter-terrorism has been established. This could include regional and international collaboration. Information is exchanged, and support given to other countries by disclosing any suspected individuals, groups, and networks in other countries. Intelligence unit and security officers of each country also work together under these frameworks.

In the national context, government bodies coordinate and collaborate with other agencies and other non-government organisations. In Indonesia, the government that is represented by the BNPT coordinates with other government agency, socio-religious organisations (SRO), educational institutions (universities and schools), Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) or Civil Society Organisation (CVO), as well as community in general. For the sake of this paper, the following will focus on the collaboration of the BNPT and socio-religious organisations (SRO), Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) or Civil Society Organisation (CVO).

In Indonesia, the socio-religious organisations (SRO) have been the best counterpart for the government agency in counter-terrorism generally and deradicalisation programmes in particular. The SRO have direct links to their constituents on the ground, outnumering any other organisation. Their constituents also tend to listen to whatever the religious leaders say, as respected public figures.

In addition the SRO also manages educational and media institutions across Indonesia. The educational institution covers kindergarten to university education all over Indonesia. They also have media outlets as their medium of socialisation and religious messaging.

Deradicalisation - in Denmark – Indonesia – Fiji

What does the future hold for returning jihadis?

4.0 Deradicalisation for New Zealand and the Pacific

With the small number of Islamists terrorism in New Zealand and the Pacific, one might think that these regions do not need deradicalisation programmes.

As described above, deradicalisation is also about prevention initiatives. While the former might be specifically directed to people having been radicalised, the latter could be designed for potentially vulnerable people and communities in general.

However, the deradicalisation programmes are different from one country to another. In the 2013 "Conference Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on Roots of Evil", the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan highlighted that counter-terrorism must understand its roots in each community, as it is a product of its socio-political circumstances. In addition to other multidisciplinary approaches, terrorism is always based on its genealogy and history. Annan argued that terrorism is always linked to its each unique history (Creenshaw, 1981). Therefore, such understanding of terrorism and deradicalisation in New Zealand and the Pacific must be linked to their region locality.

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